This study contributes to the research on industry-university interface by analysing the effect of technology transfer offices (TTO) on faculty consulting. Using fixed effects and survival analyses, I find a 25% decrease in consulting following the establishment of technology transfer offices at US universities. This effect is smaller for the researchers engaged in consulting prior to the establishment of TTO and larger for the new entrants to consulting. My findings suggest that licensing and consulting are substitutes as the sources of additional income for scientists. This result enhances our understanding of institutional change after the Bayh-Dole Act, the incentive structures of university scientists and their contribution to private sector research.
Introduction
The set of incentives for pursuing research by scientists, known as 'Pasteur's Quadrant', consists of pecuniary and intrinsic rewards (Stokes, 1997; Stephan, 1996) . Intrinsic rewards refer to the recognition, membership in the scientific community, and 'kick in the discovery' (Feynman & Robbins, 2005) . Pecuniary motives originate in the commercial potential of research output and financial rewards for problem-solving and advisory activities.
Research/academic publishing, consulting and licensing/patenting are the main academic activities of a scientist. We can trace pecuniary and intrinsic incentives in each of these activities. However, academic publishing is largely considered the highest priority and closely tied to reputational and intrinsic benefits (Aghion et This study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews recent studies in this area.
Section 3 specifies theoretical model. Section 4 provides the description of the data. Section 5 details estimation techhniques. Section 6 presents results. Section 7 contains discussion of the findings and their importance in a broader context.
Literature Review
Although the Bayh-Dole Act facilitated technology transfer from universities to private sector, encouraged academic enterpreneurship (Shane, 2004) and increased employment and welfare in local communities (Hausman, 2010) , active patenting and licensing by universities raised a number of concerns. One of them is a possibility of diversion from the basic research in favor of more commercially viable projects (Kenney & Patton, 2009 ).
Several studies exploring negative effect of university licensing and patenting on production of basic research do not cite any evidence of a trade-off between patenting/licensing activities and scientific publications. Instead, these studies find that faculty perceive patenting as a minor activity compared to the traditional scientific research and publication (Agrawal & Henderson, 2002) , actively patenting scientists are more productive than their non-patenting colleagues (Agrawal & Henderson, 2002) , patenting by scientists usually follows a number of publications on the same topic and constitute a different medium for codifying the same invention (Azoulay, Ding, & Stuart, 2007) , and revenues from licensing facilitate both basic and applied research by the same scientist (Thursby & Thursby, 2011) .
Another concern related to the proliferation of patenting by universities is the impact of newly introduced intellectual property rights on knowledge flows between basic and applied research. University patents are feared to affect the openness of scientific knowledge, stifle its dissemination, reduce the speed of scientific inquiry, and limit interaction between private sector and academic researchers (Nelson, 2004) . Basic science is essential for technological development in many industries (Mansfield, 1995) . Contributions of basic science to applied research are well established: 41% of respondents in the Carnegie-Melon survey of R&D managers consider publications and reports sponsored by public funding important to industrial R&D, 31% said that research from university or governement lab suggested a new project and 36% claimed it helped the completion of ongoing project (Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2002 property protection (Murray & Stern, 2007) . This change in incentives may cause the decline in diffusion of university knowledge in the first decade after the Bayh-Dole Act (Rosell & Agrawal, 2009 ).
I contribute to this literature by showing that the institutional changes enacted by the Bayh-Dole Act caused the reduction in private sector consulting by university researchers. This study offers an alternative explanation for the "narrowing" of knowledge flows (Rosell & Agrawal, 2009 ), which I attribute to the differences between consulting and licensing in the knowledge exchange with private sector firms. I also confirm the finding that university researchers perceive consulting and licensing as substitutes (Jensen, Thursby, & Thursby, 2010) . Finally, I propose using TTO establishment at a university to overcome endogeneity issues in measuring the effect of the Bayh-Dole Act.
Theoretical Model
The implementation of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 proved to be a difficult approximation of "institutional shock". Its impact was not uniform: for some universities it has legitimized practices already in place 2 (Mowery et al, 2004) , while for others it took many years to create institutional structures for licensing and patenting. However, we can trace 1 Mowery et al. (2004) cite the discovery of semiconductor material Gallium Nitride as a case of primary contribution of industrial researchers at the stages of discovery and early development 2 IPA (Institutional Patent Agreements) are the pre-Bayh-Dole arrangements allowing universities to patent.
the effect of the Bayh-Dole Act because in every university decision to implement policies stipulated in the Bayh-Dole Act is revealed through the establishment of a Technology Transfer Office (TTO).
TTOs manage the interface between university and industry. They search for commercially promising research within university or encourage faculty to disclose such research to them. TTOs also handle patenting and licensing process, often with the help of patent attorneys. They obtain patent protection, select licensee(s), prepare and negotiate licensing agreements, coordinate engagement of faculty in the follow-up research and commercialization. TTOs, generally have no effect on scientist's research trajectory, allocation of time, or mix of activities. However, to a certain extent, TTOs can play a role of a "watchdog" over university inventions and prevent researcher from assigning the rights over the government-funded research to a private company. This arrangement does not prevent the exchange of tacit knowledge, knowledge spill-overs and minor reshuffling of funds across projects, especially if they go either direction and contribute to both government-funded and industry-funded research ( funding: U (C, L). I do not specify functional form but assume some degree of substitution between licensing and consulting:
If a researcher handles licensing process without TTO, the marginal utility of licensing is very low because of its high costs. The researcher have to prepare patenting documentation or hire a patent attorney, draft a licensing agreement and find a licensee or launch a start-up company. TTOs bear the cost of patenting and licensing on behalf of inventor increasing the marginal utility of licensing after the establishment of a TTO (L ′ ) making it a more time-efficient source of additional funding:
The increase in the marginal utility of licensing does not affect the marginal utility of consulting. The marginal utility of licensing increases monotonically on the interval between L and L ′ .
Finally, I apply a limit to the number of hours researcher can devote to obtaining additional funding. The total number of hours spent on consulting and licensing stays the same because academic projects are of the highest priority to her: 
Further, I compare two university inventors with different initial marginal utility of consulting at the time when the marginal utility of licensing changes. The cost of consulting for the researcher decreases over time through the established working relationship with a private sector firm and the cumulative nature of work carried out for his clients. On the other hand, the cost of search for consulting offers and establishing a working relationship is higher for the inventors with no consulting experience, therefore the marginal utility of consulting for an inventor with consulting experience is higher compared to the inventors with no history of consulting.:
I assume that the difference in marginal utilities of consulting between inventors I and II remains the same after the increase in the marginal utility of licensing due to the establishment of a TTO:
. (7) I also assume that increase in marginal utility of licensing is the same for inventors I and 5 Proof is given in Appendix.
II because TTO resources are available to all faculty:
Proposition 2. Given conditions (1) , (2) , (3), (4) , (6), (7), (8) and Result (5) 
Data
The current number of technology transfer offices established in the US universities ex- 6 Proof is given in Appendix. 7 "Assignee" file lists 1830 assignee numbers as the US universities. 8 For example, Stanford University will be searched for "Stanford" and "Leland".
The unit of analysis is a patent/inventor pair. Table 1 demonstrates the data structure. Only individuals with three or more patents stay in the sample to ensure the possibility of a consulting patent between two university patents. This design allows for multiple consulting patents, including patents filed consecutively, however, in most cases, even if they repeat, consulting patents appear like isolated events.
University researchers actively patent on behalf of the government, NGOs (e.g. cancer research centers), hospitals, foreign universities, universities without membership in the AUTM and even other individuals. I delete these patents from the sample. I also exclude 9 The groups of patents assigned to different universities are separated in time and form distinct clusters.
patents filed as a result of collaboration between universities or between university and private firm as well as patents with two or more assignees.
I fail to identify consulting patents by faculty during their tenure at 31 universities from my sample. I exclude these universities from the sample, however, empirical results hold for a full list of universities.
In the end I have a sample of 73697 university patents and 4694 consulting patents assigned to 11992 university researchers from 144 universities. Table 2 presents all the universities in the sample with corresponding number of university and consulting patents.
The top 10 recipients of consulting services appear in Table 3 Table 4 reports summary statistics for all inventors and Table 5 contains summary statistics for the inventors engaged in consulting.
Finally, I create a sample imitating hazard models to test the new entry into consulting. The exit patent of a university inventor is the unit of analysis in this dataset. I define exit patent as the first consulting patent for the inventors engaged in consulting and the last university patent in the sample for the inventors who have never pursued consulting.
This sample structure enables the measurement of survival functions for the inventors in the pre-TTO environment (treated group) and post-TTO environment (control group).
I treat the first consulting patent of an inventor as a hazard event 10 . I calculate the time of "survival" in days from the first patent filed by inventor to her exit patent.
Estimation
The goal of this study is to estimate the effect of technology transfer offices on faculty consulting. I divide the data into two time periods: before the establishment of a TTO and after the establishment of a TTO at a university. Because all the universities in my sample establish a TTO at some point in time and some had a TTO before the start of the sample in 1971 11 , it is more convenient for the interpretation of results to define pre-TTO period as the treatment period and post-TTO period as the control period.
Ideally, I would like to estimate the difference in probabilities of consulting by the same reseacher at the same university in the same year in the absence and in the presence of a TTO and average it across all researchers:
whereδ is the estimate of the treatment effect, Y 1 and Y 0 are the probabilities of consulting patent before TTO and after TTO respectively. Expectation is a linear function, therefore we can estimate the treatment effect as the difference between the average probability of consulting under pre-TTO environement and average probability of consulting under a TTO:δ
However, at any given point in time a university either has or does not have a TTO.
Therefore, I can only observe the decision of inventor to file a consulting patent under one state (pre-or post-TTO):
where Y is the probability of a consulting patent and indicator T = 1{preT T O}(uy) for university u in year y.
In other words, we can only observe E(Y 1 |T uy = 1) and E(Y 0 |T uy = 0). However, 11 13 universities have TTOs before 1971.
we can use the available data to estimate the treatment effect under the condition of unconfoundedness,
Ideally, a random assignment of TTO to universities ensures the conditions of unconfoundness. In practice, the establishment of a TTO at a university is not random. It is a strategic decision by the university management caused by the increased interest in patenting and licensing. In such a way, the establishment of a TTO is endogenous to the university. Nevertheless, in this case I can treat the establishment of a TTO as exogenous because the analysis is at the level of inventor. This assumption is realistic because the decisions regarding the launch of a TTO office and its management are university-wide.
Individual faculty have little influence on this decision and often are not aware of the existence of a TTO for a period of time after it started operation. These conditions allow for unconfoundedness to hold.
15.9% of inventors in the sample experienced a pre-TTO environment in their careers.
This group may be different in their propensity to file consulting patents than the rest of the sample. I include an inventor in a treated group if he has ever experienced a pre-TTO environment in his career, I=1{preTTO}(i).
To ensure the occurence of a consulting event during the inventor's tenure at a university, I designed my sample with consulting patents "squeezed" between university patents. In such a way, I force a quadratic relationship between the inventor experience (time since the first patent) and the probability of a consulting patent. I introduce two variables, Experience and Experience 2 (X pi = Experience pi + Experience 
Possible time trends in the probability of consulting by university inventors are captured by a set of time indicators: τ y is the average probability of filing a consulting patent in year y. The probability of a consulting patent also differs across technology classes.
I include a set of indicators for technological classes: φ c is the average probability of a consulting patent across technology class c.
Group indicator I i carries a lot of heterogeneity. In other words, the characteristics of an inventor, such as university affiliation, may affect the probability of filing a consulting patent. The difference between the expected probability of consulting by treated and control inventors should be constant within pre-and post-TTO periods, E(
otherwise parallel-trends assumption is violated: cov(I i , ǫ i ) = 0. If inventors at different universities have different probabilities of filing a consulting patent, then parallel-trends assumption is violated. I introduce a set of university indicators to account for the variance attributed to the university affiliation of inventor: λ u is the average probability of consulting at university u.
Due to the variation in treatment allocation across time, i.e. TTOs at different universities are founded at different points in time, I do not observe two distinct (before and after treatment) periods for the complete sample. Instead, I have TTO "shocks" in various years. Therefore, T varies across years y and universities u and is not an interaction term.
All the models above specify difference-in-difference estimation on the aggregated sample of inventors. However, even after excluding the variance associated with the application year, technology class, and university affiliation, concern that in the case of individual researchers group indicator I i may still carry a lot of heterogeneity remains.
In practice, two researchers working at the same university and filing patents in the same technology class in the same year still differ in their individual propensity to engage in consulting. I split group indicator I i into a set of inventor fixed effects, γ i . Fortunately for this study, some researchers switched universities during their careers 12 . A sufficient number of "movers" ensures inventor fixed effects do not absorb university fixed effects.
The data is not set as time-series: the step between inventor/patent pairs can be more than a year and there can be several inventor/patent pairs in a given year by the same inventor. In such a way, simultaneous inclusion of the first order term, Experience, and year fixed effects within a group of patents by inventor does not result in collinearity.
Finally, I impose the functional form restriction and estimate a linear probability model (LPM),
where γ i is the average probability of filing a consulting patent by inventor i. γ i completely absorbs I i and controls for heterogeneity in propensity to consult across inventors.
The four sets of fixed effects improve the feasibility of parallel-trends assumption, however, I still assume there is no correlation between the sets of fixed effects, e.g. the probability of consulting increases over time at the same rate across different technological 
where Φ(•) is the standard normal distribution conditional on the parametres specified in the model.
In probit specification, the treatment effect is a change in the z-score between two probabilities of filing a consulting patent, which differ in one parameter, T :
The treatment effect in the fixed effects specification is not a coefficient on the interaction term of treatment time and group indicator 13 . In the fixed effects specification, treatment effect can be interpreted as an incremental change δ in the probabilities of an outcome in response to treatment for a particular inventor. In short, γ i , λ u , φ c and τ y are the four sets of indicators, which take a constant value of the average probabilities of consulting patent by inventor i, in technology class c, at university u, and in year y.
Because they are constants, covariances with T are zero. Therefore, marginal effect is estimated as follows:
I estimate the average marginal effects (AME) 14 . The AME is preferred interest, therefore, the AME is the preferred way of estimating the marginal effect of the change in the outcome in response to treatment. The AME of T is calculated as follows:
Finally, I estimate the probability of the first consulting patent (the entry to consulting) using Cox proportional hazard model. In the context of this model I treat the filing of a consulting patent as a hazard event. First, I generate the survival functions of the control and treated groups based on the data. I calculate the aggregate probability of surviving separately for treated and control group for periods 1 through k,
where r is the number of inventors without consulting patent at the begining of period k and d is the number of inventors filing their first consulting patent in period k. The survival function is the probability of not filing consulting patent (surviving) k or more periods from the initial date as a product of the k observed survival rates for each period:
14 Detailed discussion of the differences between the average marginal effects (AME) and marginal effects at means (MEM) is in Bartus(2005) .
I compare the two survival functions for the pre-TTO and post-TTO groups using the logrank test statistic, which has χ 2 distribution with one degree of freedom:
where E indicates expected events
I conclude the estimation of new entry to consulting by calculating coefficient from
Cox regression and hazard ratio of the probabilities of filing a consulting patent by the inventors in pre-TTO (T 1 ) and post-TTO (T 0 )environment within t days:
Results
I start the analysis of TTO effect on faculty consulting by examining economy-wide patenting trends in university and faculty consulting. The density graph in Figure 2 To test this question, I estimate a number of differences-in-differences models gradually increasing restrictions and conclude with the most restrictive, the inventor fixed effects model. Table 6 reports the results of LPM specifications on a full sample of university inventors. The outcome variable is the probability of filing a consulting patent by faculty. change is 1.84% -2.27% increase in the probability of filing a consulting patent before the establishment of TTO. The mean probability of consulting patent in this sample is 6%.
Based on the results from LPM and "trimmed" LPM estimators the relative decrease in probability of patenting is 23.5% -27.4%.
The sub-sample of university inventors engaged in consulting can be estimated using both LPM and probit regressions. The results in Tables 7 and 8 The survival functions based on the data (Table 9 and Figure 5 ) suggest that pre-TTO researchers in both samples are more likely to encounter the hazard of "filing a consulting patent" at any point during 5000 days of observation. The results of Kaplan-Meier logrank test in Table 10 confirm that the survival functions of pre-and post-TTO researchers are statistically different. The pre-TTO survival function in Figure 5 is closer to the origin indicating a higher risk to file a consulting patent. Finally, I estimate the coefficients and hazard ratios using Cox proportional hazard model in Table 11 . Both coefficients are positive suggesting higher incidence rate of consulting for pre-TTO researchers. The magnitude of effect in the most consrvative specification suggests the decrease in the probability of a consulting patent around 35.9% after a TTO foundation.
Discussion
Why Appendix.
Proof of Propositon 1.
Apply first order Taylor approximation around
Condition 4 specifies the total amount of C and L, or C ′ and L ′ , equals T:
If marginal utility of L increases and marginal utility of C is the same, then:
Apply Conditions 1, 2 and (29) to (28):
Proof of Propositon 2.
From (30):
Apply first order Taylor approximation around U (C 2 , L 2 ) and
From (33):
Subtract (34) from (35):
From (29):
According to Condition 2:
Apply (37) and (38) to (36):
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